

MANUAL OF OPERATIONS

ON THE

North-West Frontier of India

Army Headquarters, India

1925



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
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CENTRAL PUBLICATION BRANCH

1925

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E. BURDON,

Secretary to the Government of India.

DELHI;

2nd March 1925.

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MANUAL OF OPERATIONS

ON THE

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA.

CHAPTER I.

DESCRIPTIVE.

1. Introduction.

1. While the principles of war enunciated in Field Service Regulations, Vol. II, Sec. 2, remain unchanged, in campaigns in undeveloped and semi-civilized countries the armament, tactics and characteristics of the inhabitants and the nature of the theatre of operations may necessitate considerable modification in the methods of application of those principles. The modifications referred to in this manual are such as experience has shown to be necessary in operating against such an enemy as is met with on the North-West Frontier of India; and the instructions are intended to supplement, not to supersede, those contained in Field Service Regulations and the training manuals of the various arms.

2. The following brief description is intended to give a general picture of the characteristics of the country and its inhabitants in so far as they affect the conduct of operations. Detailed

information regarding any particular tribe or tract of country can be obtained from the various Military Reports published by Army Headquarters, India.

2. *The country.*

1. The country consists generally of a succession of mountain ranges from which run down a tangled mass of rugged precipitous ridges, intersected by deep narrow valleys.

More often than not the only possible routes for formed bodies of troops and transport lie along the valleys, with an occasional steep pass over some intervening ridge. These routes are mere mule tracks and considerable work is usually required to make them passable even for camels.

In some areas the hills are rocky and devoid of vegetation, in others they are thickly covered with trees and scrub.

In the vicinity of the foothills the country is cut up by ravines covered with scrub, and in these conditions the tactics of the tribesmen are most dangerous.

The country as a whole is sterile and the climate rigorous, with extremes of heat and cold.

Water is scarce, except in the main valleys.

Sudden and dangerous spates are liable to occur after heavy rain.

2. Except for a limited and precarious supply of straw (Bhusa), firewood and meat, local resources are practically nil, and all supplies have to be carried.

Owing to the absence of good roads, it is as a rule impossible to use wheeled and motor transport. Pack animals alone can accompany a column in the hills, and these are normally unable to move on a wide front. Supply columns and train are therefore both long and vulnerable; and, as there is a limit to the

number of men and animals which it is possible to move over one road during the hours of daylight, a force may have to be broken up into smaller columns, moving by separate routes, or on the same road at a day's interval. Against a badly organized enemy this is not so dangerous as it might be in other circumstances.

3. *The Pathans.*

1. The poverty of the country drives the inhabitants to raid their neighbours, and the Pathans, bred in an atmosphere of robbery and blood feuds, are intensely independent and jealous of intrusion into their country.

They are active, hardy and skilled marksmen, adept in all the arts of individual warfare, always seeking and seldom missing an opportunity.

As a rule they neither give nor expect quarter, and a wounded Pathan should always be regarded with suspicion, and precautions taken against possible treachery.

2. Their armament at present consists of rifles, including a considerable number of modern high-velocity weapons, swords and knives. Their supplies of ammunition are precarious and do not admit of their making use of such automatic weapons as fall into their hands, but the possibility of their using automatic small arms, and even artillery, in the future cannot be altogether ignored.

3. They lack the organization of a regular army, but they are capable of offering stubborn resistance to an advancing column. Their mobility enables them to concentrate rapidly for a fight.

In following up a force withdrawing, harassing a column in country suited to their tactics, or attacking a detachment isolated beyond reach of support, they are most formidable foes. Though their favourite weapon is the rifle, they are capable of showing reckless gallantry in attacking with swords

and knives, and of covering such attacks with effective rifle fire.

4. The Pathans are divided into tribes and sub-tribes, and the extent to which these will co-operate against a common enemy is always uncertain. A tribe will naturally pay more attention to the defence of its own territory, but on occasion they have sunk their feuds and made common cause against us.

5. The tribal system of intelligence is very complete. All movements of troops are closely watched, and, at the first threat of an advance into their country, the implicated sections hasten to conceal their grain and send their women, children and cattle into neutral territory, or to the fastnesses of the upper hills.

6. They have no settled form of government and no capital. The more fertile valleys usually contain collections of villages which form possible objectives of varying importance.

These villages are built for defence, with bullet-proof walls, loopholes, watch towers and flanking and other defences, and are usually strong tactical points in inter-tribal fighting. At times desperate outlaws have held them against regular troops, but as a rule the tribesmen prefer to fight on the open hillside, owing to the difficulty of escape from a village. Consequently villages are often found to be unoccupied, and may on occasion serve to protect a benighted force.

CHAPTER II.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

4. *The principles of war.*

The main effect of the characteristics of the country and the Pathans on the methods of applying the principles of war may be summarized as follows:—

i. **Maintenance of the objective.**—The ultimate aim is, as always, the destruction of the enemy's forces, and this must ever be held in view.

It often happens, however, that the enemy forces can only be induced to collect by means of an advance on some particular locality. In such cases it must be borne in mind that the occupation of a tract of country is only a means to an end.

ii. **Offensive action.**—The susceptibility of this class of enemy to moral influences is a most important factor. Hesitation, delay or any retrograde movement are at once interpreted as signs of weakness and, while the braver of the enemy are encouraged, the waverers, always to be found amongst undisciplined forces, are tempted to throw in their lot with what appears to be the winning side. A vigorous offensive, strategical as well as tactical, is always the safest method of conducting operations.

The freedom of the enemy from the complicated organization of a regular army, his individual independence and his ability to disperse at will, necessitate a crushing blow if the result of an action is to be decisive. Care should therefore be

taken not to induce him to abandon a position by too great a display of force, nor to manoeuvre him out of it, unless it is too strong to be taken without undue loss.

iii. **Surprise.**—Owing to the fact that the regular troops are usually compelled to operate in the valleys, the enemy has superior opportunities of observation, and surprise, tactical or strategical, is therefore unusually difficult of achievement. Capable leaders with well trained troops have, however, often succeeded in outwitting the tribesmen by means of night movements and ruses, and the moral effect of such successes cannot be exaggerated.

iv. **Concentration.**—The limited size of a column which can operate on a hill track, and the large number of protective detachments necessitated by the nature of the operations, are apt to lead to dissipation of strength and subsequent inability to concentrate as strong a force as is desirable at the decisive time and place.

v. **Economy of force.**—The difficulty of moving large bodies of troops in the hills makes it essential to employ the smallest force considered adequate for any given task.

Protective detachments must be reduced to the minimum compatible with security.

vi. **Security.**—The nature of the country and the characteristics of the enemy enhance the importance of protection. As the Pathans are adepts in laying ambushes and effecting surprises, and seldom fail to take advantage of an opportunity, vigilance and precautions must never be relaxed. Reconnaissance, even when everything appears to be

absolutely secure, should be pushed out as far as prudence permits, and every endeavour made to preclude all possibility of surprise.

vii. **Mobility.**—The difficulty of movement on the steep hill sides, and the necessity for employing pack transport and for moving on a narrow front, greatly restrict the mobility of regular troops.

Every effort must be made to overcome this disability, by lightening the load carried by the troops, by judicious subdivision of columns, by reducing transport to a minimum, and by improving the roads.

Wheeled and motor transport is much more economical on the line of communication than pack, and the vehicles offer a less tempting bait to raiders than animals. The question of the construction of motor roads should therefore always be considered. If the occupation of the country is likely to be prolonged, such provision will almost certainly be necessary.

viii. **Co-operation.**—The tactical co-operation of all arms is as important as in any other form of warfare, and the nature of the country facilitates this in many respects.

5. *The plan of campaign.*

Whatever the objective, in deciding on the force to be employed and the route (or routes) by which to advance, various factors have to be taken into consideration, e.g. :—

- i. The opposition likely to be met with; the fighting strength and number of modern rifles in the hands of the tribesmen, and the possibility of tribes and sub-

tribes, usually hostile to each other, combining against an invader.

- ii. The size of a column which, equipped with pack transport, can march a reasonable distance in the hours of daylight in the proposed theatre.

As a rough guide it may be taken that an infantry brigade with a squadron of cavalry, a brigade of pack artillery, a company of sappers and miners and ancillary services, will seldom traverse more than ten miles a day on a hill track, and opposition and physical obstacles may reduce the length of march very considerably.

- iii. The advisability of operating with two or more columns moving by parallel or converging routes.

This is often advantageous, and the risk is not so great as when fighting an organized enemy. At the same time the difficulty of intercommunication between columns operating by separate routes must be borne in mind, and each must be strong enough to secure its own safety.

- iv. The absence of cross-country roads and the scarcity of water usually necessitate an advance along the bed of a perennial stream, where the enemy has full scope for his favourite harassing tactics, and where he may be tempted to stand and fight to dispute the passage of some narrow defile. If a feasible route can be found which crosses a succession of passes over the intervening ridges, it is probable that he will oppose the crossing of the passes, thus affording a possible opportunity for inflicting on him a severe blow.

- v. Even when organised resistance has been overcome, the Pathans almost invariably resort to guerilla

tactics, and a prolonged occupation of the country, punitive expeditions against recalcitrant sub-tribes and the destruction of villages and crops may have to be resorted to in order to compel submission.

6. Form of operations.

The operations may therefore be expected to take one of the following forms:—

- i. A column of all arms advancing in the face of opposition of varying degree, either along the course of a valley, or crossing a ridge, or succession of ridges from one valley to another.
- ii. An organized attack on a position where the tribesmen have massed to oppose the advance.
- iii. An expedition by a flying column to punish a recalcitrant tribe, to demolish a group of villages, to forage or in pursuit of a raiding gang.

In such cases the column may often have to return by the same route by which it went out.

- iv. Practically every operation, strategical or tactical, eventually develops into a withdrawal, and it is then that the Pathan is most active and dangerous.

However complete and crushing the effect of an attack may have been, however peaceful and quiet the tribesmen may appear, it is practically certain that they will be unable to resist the temptation of harrying the troops once the latter begin to withdraw.

7. *Night operations.*

1. In circumstances which admit of careful reconnaissance and pre-arrangement, a surprise may often be effected and casualties minimised by means of a night operation.

The enemy, though usually vigilant, is not always so during the hours of darkness, especially on cold nights and in wet weather, when he sometimes draws off completely.

A night move may make possible an operation which cannot otherwise be carried out on a short winter's day.

2. With sufficiently careful pre-arrangement, such operations as the following may well be more easily effected under cover of darkness :—

An advance as a prelude to an attack.

The seizure of a piquet position or important points on the line of advance.

The surrounding of a village.

CHAPTER III.

FIGHTING TROOPS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS.

8. *General.*

The main advantage which regular troops have over such an enemy lies in systematic training and in the ability to organize the resources of civilization and science and to use them in co-operation. Only if this advantage is pressed to the utmost can we hope to attain the fullest possible measure of success.

9. *Infantry.*

1. As in all other forms of warfare, success in battle depends ultimately on the infantry, whose aim will, as always, be to close with the enemy.

2. In India, infantry units, both British and Indian, have only one section of four Vickers guns per battalion and one Lewis gun per platoon.

The reduced number of automatic weapons is partly due to the difficulty of ammunition supply, but the numerous occasions on which a platoon has to be called upon to carry out a tactical operation single handed, *e.g.*, the occupation of a piquet position, and the enhanced value of the rifle in such fighting, make it desirable to retain three rifle sections in order to give the platoon the necessary power of manœuvre and weight in the assault.

The nature of the operations frequently necessitates the subdivision of machine gun units, and the employment of sub-sections independently.

3. The movement of infantry up a steep slope is a slow and laborious process.

Every possible means of increasing their mobility, by special training and by reducing the weight carried by the man, must be developed. Provided fire discipline is good, it is seldom necessary for infantry to carry more than the 100 rounds of ammunition which are normally carried on the man in India.

4. Troops in a ravine or depression are at a disadvantage as regards mobility, observation and angle of fire. Therefore, as a general rule, both advance and withdrawal should be conducted along spurs rather than depressions. Ravines should be avoided unless their exact course is known and the heights on both sides are held.

5. The importance of covering the movement of infantry by fire cannot be exaggerated, and the formation of the country facilitates the provision of covering fire by artillery and by infantry weapons, overhead as well as from the flank.

6. A sufficient number of guns will seldom be available to support the movements of the infantry with any great volume of artillery fire, nor are targets suitable for artillery fire often presented. Moreover the nature of the fighting calls for speed in developing covering fire rather than for weight of projectiles. Therefore the fire of machine guns must be carefully organized and controlled to supplement the artillery in this task. The most effective support can usually be attained by taking certain machine gun units under Brigade control.

In certain circumstances, as for instance in the defence of a camp or post, the fire power of machine guns enables the strength of the garrison to be materially reduced.

7. Grenades and rifle grenades are of value in dislodging the enemy from steep rocky ground where he cannot be reached by rifle or other small arms fire, and may also be used to deny to him dead ground in the vicinity of a piquet.

The effect of their weight on the mobility of the men must, however, be considered, and they should not ordinarily form part of the equipment of the infantry soldier.

8. Smoke may often be useful in covering the movements of the forward bodies of infantry in the attack, in piqueting operations and in the withdrawal; also in organizing a counter attack and in various ruses.

10. Cavalry.

1. In difficult hilly country opportunities for cavalry action are rare; but, since horsemen are dreaded by hill people, they should be employed whenever the ground permits.

2. In the more open ground and foothills, chances may occur of surprising the tribesmen when they have ventured into the plain, cutting them off and operating against them mounted.

3. In fairly open valleys, cavalry may prove of assistance to the advanced guard, preceding the infantry, carrying out reconnaissances and piqueting low hills until relieved by the infantry of the advanced guard.

4. In more difficult ground cavalry are able, in certain circumstances, to take advantage of their mobility to reach a tactical point rapidly with a view to dismounted action.

5. In suitable country cavalry may often be usefully employed in reconnoitring the vicinity of a camp in the evening, to guard against the enemy massing for a night attack.

11. Artillery.

1. Normally only pack artillery can accompany a column in the hills.

Owing to the armament of the enemy this is not a serious drawback, but light and medium guns and howitzers should be

employed whenever circumstances permit. The range and shell power of the latter make them specially valuable for the distant bombardment of villages and towers.

2. While artillery support of the infantry, both in attack and withdrawal, is of the first importance, the difficulties of ammunition supply preclude anything of the nature of barrage fire, except possibly for a very short duration of time and in special circumstances.

Artillery fire usually takes the form of concentrations on points or areas of temporary tactical importance.

12. Tanks and armoured cars.

1. Owing to their invulnerability to rifle fire and their power of firing while in movement, tanks and armoured cars have great potential value whenever the ground permits of their use.

2. In the advance and withdrawal they may be used to keep the enemy at a distance.

In the attack they can be usefully employed to make good ground in advance of the infantry.

3. As the number of tanks is likely to be strictly limited, they should be used with care and reserved for occasions when it is anticipated that the infantry will be unable to carry out the required task without undue loss.

4. Armoured cars can move on any cart road and in favourable circumstances across country, provided the surface is hard and the ground is not too much cut up by ravines.

Their mobility makes them most valuable for reconnaissance and pursuit, for the rapid support of a detachment and for escorting motor convoys.

13. Engineers and pioneers.

Both engineers and pioneers are armed and trained so as to enable them to protect their own working parties. If, however, infantry can be made available for protective duties, it admits of the technical troops being fully employed on work.

14. Aircraft.

1. Aircraft are of the greatest value in tactical co-operation with troops, and the effect of this tactical action, both moral and material, is very great.

By offensive action they can materially assist the advanced guard, flanking piquets and rear guard. They are of special value in relieving the pressure on the rearmost infantry in a withdrawal.

Aeroplanes will often be the most effective weapon with which to carry out a pursuit.

2. They can also be employed for reconnaissance and photography, for the observation of artillery fire, for intercommunication and for offensive action against villages and selected areas.

3. Local geographical and atmospheric conditions make the task of the Royal Air Force one of peculiar difficulty.

The paucity of landing grounds in the hills often necessitates long-distance flights from the air base to the scene of operations. Consequently, whenever the ground permits, a landing ground should be cleared in the vicinity of the troops.

If this is impracticable, pilots must be kept in touch with events by the most suitable means of communication between ground and air.

During combined ground and air operations the R. A. F. commander should make every endeavour to provide the Force

commander with a R. A. F. liaison officer, who should, whenever possible, be provided with a W-T station.

4. Provided sufficient Royal Air Force units are available, the moral and material effect of a vigorous and sustained aerial offensive may render operations by troops unnecessary. The effect of purely air action is, however, most difficult to gauge, and where a permanent effect is essential to the plan of campaign, such action will have to be followed up by an advance of troops.

CHAPTER IV.

INFORMATION AND RECONNAISSANCE.

15. General.

The general principles laid down in Field Service Regulations, Volume II, Chapter VI, apply equally to mountain warfare, but their application must be modified to suit the terrain and the character of the enemy.

16 Reconnaissance.

1. The work of reconnaissance will fall chiefly on the Royal Air Force and infantry, though cavalry and armoured cars should be employed whenever the ground permits.

Against an enemy who gives no quarter, small reconnoitring parties cannot be employed beyond reach of support.

2. An enemy who intends to attack after dusk usually moves fairly close to camp during daylight and his intention of effecting a surprise may often be frustrated if the adjacent country is reconnoitred during the afternoon by aircraft or by troops.

If the latter are employed, they should remain out as late as is compatible with their safe return to camp.

This is a duty on which cavalry may often be employed.

3. To supplement air reconnaissance, advantage should be taken of the possession of commanding heights to examine thoroughly all the country within sight.

It should also be impressed on all troops, and particularly on those on piquet, that it is their duty to report immediately any movements of the enemy and especially any indication of hostile gatherings towards dusk.

4. Thorough ground reconnaissance is of the first importance, and for this purpose air photographs, both vertical and oblique, are of the greatest value.

5. In broken ground it is easy for the enemy to conceal themselves from observation from the air. Consequently little value should be attached to negative air reports.

17. *Secrecy.*

Intelligence agents, though their services cannot be dispensed with, must always be regarded with suspicion.

CHAPTER V.

PROTECTION.

18. *General principles.*

The leading consideration is to deny to the enemy the most important points from which he can bring effective fire to bear.—This is a precaution which must never be neglected, even when the country is to all appearance unoccupied.

At the same time, commanders of protective detachments must guard against being led into climbing higher and higher in order to obtain a better field of fire or greater command of ground, if by so doing they would make it difficult to extricate their command when the time comes to withdraw.

PROTECTION WHEN ON THE MOVE.

19. *Necessity for avoiding delay.*

The length of the column, the narrow frontage on which it must normally move, the difficulty of the track and the time taken in protecting the flanks, all tend to make an advance, even if unopposed, a slow and tedious process.

This, together with the danger of any portion of a column being on the road after dark, limits the length of a day's march. **Every precaution must therefore be taken to avoid any unnecessary delay.**

20. *Method of flank protection.*

1. The most suitable method of flank protection is to piquet the heights which command and the ravines which open into, the

line of march, but it may occasionally be necessary to detail, in addition, a special force to guard a threatened flank.

2. In all movements involving a subsequent withdrawal, such as reconnaissances, foraging, etc., no defile through which the troops will have to pass in returning, and no commanding point from which an enemy could harass the withdrawal, should be left unguarded.

21. *The advanced guard.*

1. Flank piquets are normally furnished by the advanced guard, which will therefore consist of three bodies, vanguard, main guard and piqueting troops.

2. The vanguard and main guard should remain constant throughout the march. Their primary duty is as outlined in Field Service Regulations, Volume II, Section 47, viz., to enable the main body to advance. In addition, the main guard may be required to bring fire to bear to assist the piquets into position.

3. Machine guns, some pack artillery and sappers or pioneers for work on the road, should accompany the advanced guard.

4. The piqueting troops, which normally consist of infantry only, should march immediately behind the main guard, but, as the turn of each company for piqueting approaches, this company should work up to the head of the main guard, from which point the advanced guard commander will post the piquets.

Not more than a battalion should be detailed as piqueting troops in the first instance. When the greater part of this battalion has been expended, more troops from the head of the main body will be moved up to the advanced guard.

Infantry for this purpose, in strength according to the length of the march, nature of the country, and degree of opposition likely to be met with will be detailed to march at the head of the main body.

5. In the absence of hostile artillery, the distance between the vanguard and main guard may be reduced with safety and advantage.

The distance between the advanced guard and the main body cannot be laid down, as it is constantly varying. If the piqueting at the beginning of a march is likely to be a slow process, it will often be advisable for the advanced guard to start some time before the main body. In such circumstances it must be strong enough to overcome any likely opposition until such time as the main body can come up.

6. In difficult country or in the face of strenuous opposition, it may be advisable prior to a march to establish piquets in advance to a certain distance along the route.

22. *The advanced guard commander.*

1. In addition to the conduct of the vanguard and main guard, the responsibility for seeing that the route is properly piqueted is vested in the advanced guard commander.

2. He is also responsible for the protection of the site selected for the camp until the camp piquets are in position (Sec. 28).

3. Every endeavour must be made to avoid delaying the march, by foreseeing the points at which piquets will be required, and by sending them out in good time. The advanced guard should move by bounds, putting out as many piquets as possible at each halt.

Arrangements must always be made to cover by fire piquets moving into position. This will generally necessitate bringing artillery or machine guns, or both, into action.

23. *Flank piquets.*

1. Piquets should be posted so as to deny to the enemy the most dangerous approaches and the most important points

within effective range of the route, and to support one another. They must never withdraw without a definite order to do so.

Where necessary, supports should be posted at suitable points to cover the piquets and to assist their eventual withdrawal.

Every piquet must be in visual communication with the road, either direct or through a support or a subsidiary piquet placed for the purpose.

As far as possible every piquet should contain signallers or men who can semaphore.

2. Piquets normally have to remain in position for some hours. They must therefore be self-contained in all respects. Piquets vary in strength from a section to a platoon, and on occasion may be even stronger. They should always consist of complete sub-units, the advanced guard commander stating the minimum number of rifles required.

In order to make certain of securing a piquet position, it may often be necessary in the first instance to detach a larger body than is required eventually to hold it. Subsequently the minimum required for the task will be left as piquet, and the remainder withdrawn.

3. Where the ground is well known and lends itself to definite division into sections, a complete unit or sub-unit may be made responsible for each section, the unit commander elaborating the detail. As a rule, however, the ground is so intricate that it is only possible to post piquets in detail, each piquet site being selected and each piquet sent off by the advanced guard commander.

4. In the latter case, piquets and supports should be numbered consecutively throughout, whether posted to right or left of the road.

Every piquet commander will be given two copies of a piquet slip (Appendix I). One copy will be retained by the piquet commander, and one given to the "road sentry" usually posted

to indicate the position of the piquet to the rear guard commander as the latter approaches.

5. The normal organization and chain of command should in no circumstances be departed from.

A company commander remains responsible for the co-ordination of the various portions of his command, even when split up in piquets, and must take such steps as are possible in the circumstances to ensure mutual support and co-operation.

When his command is expanded, he should establish his headquarters, retaining a proportion as a reserve, arrange his system of intercommunication and report to the rear-guard commander in time to assist in withdrawing the piquets found by his command.

6. It may not be possible for mules to be brought up to the piquet positions, but provision may have to be made for reserve ammunition and for the men's great coats if the piquet is likely to remain in position for long.

24. The rear guard.

1. (a) In the *advance*, a small force of infantry will usually suffice for the rear guard.

At times, however, the enemy is liable to attack the rear guard of an advancing force, particularly on such occasions as when the force is moving into camp for the night. In such cases the co-operation of all arms becomes essential.

(b) In a *withdrawal* the co-operation of all arms must always be provided for.

Whether effective co-operation can best be attained by placing a force of all arms under the command of the rear guard commander, or by retaining control of the supporting artillery in the hands of the column commander, depends on circumstances.

2. When vigorously followed up, the pace of the rear guard will inevitably be very slow. In these circumstances it is essential to retain a considerable portion of the force towards the rear of the column and to regulate their pace by the rear guard.

25. *The rear guard commander.*

1. In addition to the conduct of the rear guard, the rear guard commander is responsible for the protection of the camp site from which the force is marching and for the withdrawal of the flank piquets and their supports.

2. When withdrawing piquets the rear guard commander should always work through the company commander if the latter is at hand.

A distinctive flag will be carried with the main guard on which the piquets will direct their retirement.

Each piquet in turn will be given permission to retire by a simple pre-arranged signal; the actual moment for withdrawal must, however, be left to the discretion of the piquet commander.

3. Piquets when withdrawn are at the disposal of the rear guard commander, but, as it is not desirable to have a large number of men with the rear guard, all piquets not urgently required with that body should be ordered to rejoin their units.

4. It is usually advisable for the rear guard commander to move between the main guard and the rear party.

5. If the rear guard commander considers it impossible to reach camp before nightfall, it will often be advisable for him to halt and bivouac for the night in the most favourable position for defence, informing the commander of the force of his intention betimes. Such a decision should be arrived at in time to allow at least three hours of daylight for the preparation of the halting place for defence, unless it is possible to economise time and labour by occupying a village.

Arrangements must be made for troops and transport at the tail of the main body to form a fresh rear guard and join the main column, or else to join the original rear guard; also for piquets which have been posted either to be withdrawn or to remain in position for the night.

DEFENCE AND PROTECTION WHEN AT REST.

26. *General.*

In this form of warfare a mobile force should never adopt a defensive attitude. Defence therefore usually takes the form of the defence of a perimeter camp, a post, or a piquet.

In these circumstances the problems of defence and of protection when at rest are so closely allied that they are best considered together.

27. *Protection of camp.*

1. The most serious danger to be guarded against is a night attack. Consequently, whenever a force halts for the night, the perimeter of the camp or bivouac will be prepared for defence. The system of defence of the perimeter is outlined in Sec. 29.

2. For the protection of the camp, piquets will be posted so as to watch dangerous approaches and to deny to the enemy commanding ground from which he could bring effective fire to bear on the camp by day or night.

Distant patrolling, even by day, is as a rule a hazardous undertaking. Observation must therefore be carried out from the piquet.

3. As night patrolling is usually impracticable, it may be necessary to post a considerable number of piquets. The number

of piquets may be much reduced if a camp site can be found which is defiladed by rising ground, which may, if near enough, be used as a perimeter, or on a commanding bluff, along the edge of which the perimeter can run; also by arranging for ground that is not piqueted to be searched by the fire of guns and machine guns from the camp.

4. On reaching the halting place, the first duty of the commander of a column is, therefore, to select the most easily defensible site for the camp, to detail the camp piquets and to coordinate the defence of the whole.

5. Until the camp piquets have been posted, the troops of the advanced guard remain responsible for the protection of the camp site, and should commence strengthening the selected piquet positions. The advanced guard commander will be informed by column headquarters when he can withdraw his troops.

28. *Camp piquets.*

1. Piquets must hold their positions at all costs and must be self-contained as regards ammunition and bombs, signal lights, food, water, etc.

It is an advantage if they can support one another by fire, and arrangements should be made for their support by the fire of guns and machine guns from the camp.

Intercommunication must be established by means of cable, visual and signal lights.

The use of signal lights must be strictly controlled, and reserved for real emergencies.

Blankets and great coats are required, as the nights are cold.

2. Piquets are usually furnished by the units to whose front they are posted, and no outpost commander is appointed.

The selection of the exact position of each piquet will be made by the company commander concerned.

3. The strength of a piquet may be from one or two rifle sections to a platoon or more. Whether or not it is desirable to place a Lewis gun in a piquet depends on circumstances.

Piquets are found by complete sub-units, but the minimum number of rifles for each piquet should be decided by the column commander.

4. In order to save time, and to give the troops who are detailed for piquet duty an opportunity of resting and feeding, battalion arrangements should be made for other sub-units to construct the sangars and to act as carrying parties.

In case it is necessary to reinforce a piquet by night, the sub-unit which built the sanga and knows the ground may suitably be detailed for this duty.

5. The ground seldom admits of digging, and the most suitable and easily constructed form of work is a 'sanga' built of stone, or sand bags filled with shale where suitable rocks are scarce. The largest stones available should be used in building, and a supply of stones and filled sand bags for repairing it collected inside the sanga.

6. A circular type of piquet sanga can be constructed most rapidly, but the plan should be such as to command ground from which the enemy can snipe the camp or bomb the piquet.

When the sanga is overlooked from within rifle range, an inner ring or line of wall is necessary to form a parados.

The minimum height of the parapet should be 4 ft. 6 ins. and the thickness 3 ft. at the bottom and 2 ft. 6 ins. at the top. Increased command and defilade are gained by raising the height of the parapet, in which case it is necessary to add a fire step. The length of the parapet should be from 1 to 2 yards per rifle.

7. Sand bags and sods are useful to reduce the danger of splinters. Head cover should be irregular in form. Large stones should be used if sand bags are not available.

In the event of enemy assault, the parapet must be manned and fire delivered over it, since only by this means can sufficient volume be obtained.

Loopholes are not very easy to construct unless timber, box loopholes or steel plates happen to be available. Failing these, should their construction be considered essential, they may be made with large stones.

Care must be taken that loopholes are suitably sited and concealed, that the opening on the outside is as small as possible, and that they are at a suitable height above ground level, or the level of the firestep.

8. Complicated doors should be avoided. A gap 3 ft. wide should be left in the parapet to serve as an entrance. This should either be covered by a traverse, or, if time is short, stones should be placed inside the sangan on either side of the gap wherewith to block it when the garrison is inside.

Later a more convenient entrance, protected by a traverse, can be constructed.

9. Builders should work in pairs, one man inside and one outside the parapet, served by carriers who should be organised in lines, stones being passed from hand to hand as in fire drill, not carried long distances by individual carriers.

Work should begin on the enemy side of the sangan if the situation permits.

While building is in progress, sand bags should be filled in readiness to place on top of the parapet.

One or two picks and shovels should be left with the garrison.

10. The defences should be improved from day to day, a wire or other obstacle being provided.

Rabbit wire forms an effective protection against bombs.

11. Every man of the garrison should be told off to an alarm post. Normally one-third of the garrison should remain on the alert at night. The commander should sleep beside a sentry.

12. In case of attack, piquets must hold their own at all costs. Fire of guns and machine guns from the camp can often be directed by signal from a piquet on enemy massed in its vicinity.

13. The relief of camp piquets should always take place in daylight. The relieving and relieved piquets must invariably move with every military precaution.

When breaking camp the rear guard commander becomes responsible for the protection of the camp site. When possible the rear guard should take over camp piquets in time to allow these to rejoin their units before marching.

29. *The defensive perimeter.*

1. The defensive perimeter round the camp must be clearly defined by a parapet, or preferably parapet and trench combined. It may be advisable to add a ditch.

The plan should be as regular as possible to avoid the danger of troops firing into each other. Corners should be blunted.

Parapet and trench should be rapidly constructed, and the defences improved as opportunity offers by providing support trenches, traverses and parados. All exits must be traversed and blocked with obstacles by night.

If possible, an obstacle all round the perimeter should be constructed.

2. The aim of the defence should be to prevent the enemy from entering camp by means of carefully controlled fire from the perimeter.

The defence should therefore be based on a framework of machine guns, with light automatic guns sweeping any ground that is dead to the machine guns.

If possible, the entire perimeter should be manned by troops. Where the troops are inadequate for this, the defence should consist of flanking redoubts with obstacles between.

The camp is divided by cross roads into definite areas. The troops are divided into those manning the perimeter, supports and unit reserves. In addition a general reserve for the whole force is posted centrally.

In case the enemy succeeds in penetrating, he should be isolated by the reserves extending along the roads, and attacked with the bayonet. Troops on the perimeter should not leave their posts, and no firing should be permitted inside the camp.

3. The infantry of the force will be so disposed as to man the perimeter in case of attack, each salient and exit being held by one unit.

Normally each battalion will only be able to provide from half to three quarters of its strength for perimeter defence, the remainder being required for piquets and reserve.

Each company on the perimeter should find its own supports.

4. Each sub-unit on the perimeter will detail approximately one fourth of its strength as "inlying piquet" to remain in constant readiness for action. Whether one section per platoon or one platoon per company should be detailed depends on circumstances.

These provide the necessary sentries, and by night sleep accoutred.

In case of alarm, inlying piquets fall in at once, but fire must only be opened in the event of a genuine night attack, and must be strictly controlled.

5. If the infantry are insufficient for the purpose, pioneers, sappers and miners, cavalry and even artillery may be allotted

to man a part of the perimeter, but the frontage of a battery should be limited so that, if a section has to be moved, it can still provide sufficient small-arm fire to defend its allotted portion of the perimeter.

6. Guns should, if possible, be placed so as to be able to fire in any required direction.

Guns and machine guns, detailed to fire on any ground within rifle range which is not piqueted (Sec. 27 3) should lay out night firing lines and register if necessary.

7. Cavalry should as a rule be kept in reserve, and, in the event of an attack on the camp, the possibility of mounted pursuit in daylight should always be considered.

8. The rôle of machine guns is as follows:—

- (a) To prevent the enemy entering camp.
 - (b) To support camp piquets and any detached posts within range.
 - (c) To open fire on lines of approach likely to be used by an enemy.
 - (d) In exceptional cases, to reply to snipers when their fire becomes heavy.
 - (e) A proportion should always be held in reserve.
- (a) The first and most important rôle of machine guns is to prevent the enemy entering the camp. Some machine guns will therefore be on the perimeter, sited as low as possible and so arranged as to sweep all approaches with fire. They should not as a rule be placed in salients as it is better to lock these with fire from other parts of the perimeter.
- (b) Some machine guns on the perimeter should be detailed to support camp piquets and any detached post within range. This covering fire will normally be directed on both flanks of the piquet position, or on dangerous places previously registered. When the number of available guns permits, special

guns should be detailed for this purpose so as not to break the bands of fire round the perimeter.

Machine guns should never be placed in the camp piquets except for some special purpose such as to cover ground which cannot be reached from the perimeter.

(c) Pathans are little addicted to collective movement by night except with the object of attacking or sniping the camp or piquets. It follows that harassing fire is seldom required. Probable lines of approach should, however, be registered in case the enemy is heard massing with a view to assaulting the camp.

(d) In cases where the fire of snipers becomes really troublesome, orders may be issued for selected machine guns to deal with it, either by firing at ground from which flashes are observed, or by shooting at likely sniping haunts previously located.

(e) A proportion only of the available machine gun sections should be on duty as the detachments must have rest.

9. Signal lights may be usefully employed to discover the enemy preparing to attack, and to enable effective fire to be brought to bear. Fires and flares may also be lighted outside the camp for this purpose, care being taken that they are so placed that the smoke is not blown towards the perimeter.

10. On no account will indiscriminate firing at snipers be allowed, as this merely encourages the snipers, wastes ammunition and keeps the whole camp awake. A sniper's objects usually are:—

- (i) To ascertain the position of piquets and sentries on the perimeter.
- (ii) To disturb the whole force.
- (iii) To inflict loss.

If their fire is not returned, they fail in the first two of these objects and of the third they are never certain. They then

probably begin to fear a trap and make off, and the camp is left in peace.

If, however, their fire is returned, the position of piquets and sentries is disclosed to the enemy, and the troops are deprived of rest, while the chance of doing any damage to the snipers is small, since they always take care to get behind good cover, and nothing is visible beyond the flash of their rifles.

A successful ambush has, however, a very deterrent effect.

Similarly, ill-considered firing of signal lights and throwing of grenades should be repressed. Constant lighting up of the ground disturbs the camp, displays nervousness and encourages the enemy. Whether from piquet or perimeter, lights should not be sent up unless there is distinct evidence of the enemy's presence and until all preparations have been made to open fire on him when illuminated.

30. *Defence of a village.*

When it is decided to use a village for the night, combatant troops should occupy a perimeter around the village, the houses being used for the hospital and for degrading animals and non-combatants rather than for shelter. Passages around the outer line of houses, and roadways through the village are essential. Organised precautions against fire must be taken by each unit.

CHAPTER VI.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

31. *Posts.*

1. Posts capable of affording protection to convoys should normally be established on the line of communication at intervals of a day's march. The garrisons of these posts must be of sufficient strength to provide for their defence, for escorts to convoys half way to each neighbouring post, and also to find the garrisons for all permanent piquets in their area.

2. The system of defence of a post on the line of communication is similar to that of a perimeter camp (Secs. 26-29), but in such a post, and in a permanent frontier post, it is necessary to provide for the protection of a transport camp out of all proportion to the size of the garrison, which will therefore seldom suffice to man the entire perimeter.

The transport may be accommodated in a separate enclosure surrounded with an effective obstacle and protected by fire, from flanking redoubts. By siting these redoubts so that the ground is swept by automatic fire, the strength of the garrison can be reduced to a minimum.

A reserve is required in the enclosure by night in case the enemy penetrates.

As the defences of the post are improved, it will be possible to reduce the number of piquets.

32. *Protection of convoys.*

Flank protection for convoys *en route* may either be provided by the troops of post garrisons moving out daily to piquet

the route, or by the establishment of permanent piquets, the garrisons of which remain in position for a week or more or by a combination of the two methods.

Permanent piquets are more economical and secure, but take time to establish. Meanwhile, the former method must be employed, the garrisons of posts being proportionately increased.

33. *Permanent piquets.*

1. Permanent piquets should be sited so as to command a main line of approach to the road or to hold some tactical feature of major importance. They must be self contained as regards ammunition, stores, food and water. Bombs, signal lights, tools, spare wire, stakes and sand bags should also be provided.

2. The defences must be improved so that they can be held by the minimum garrison, and are impregnable to assault and impervious to sniping and bombing, flanking fire being arranged and alternative positions provided for Lewis guns, also an effective obstacle.

An attack should be repulsed by fire over the parapet, but loopholes are required for sentries. These must be blinded and care must be taken that they cannot be used from outside. A rabbit-wire roof forms an effective protection against bombs.

Signal communication must be provided and the signallers protected.

Some simple means should be devised of indicating to troops and convoys on the road whether or not all is clear, *e.g.*, a signal to denote the alert.

3. The garrison of a permanent piquet may consist of anything from a rifle section to a platoon or more.

One of the mobile bodies referred to in Sec. 34 may occasionally require to be accommodated in the piquet for the night. Consequently the piquet must be constructed to hold more than the minimum garrison, *e.g.*, a piquet designed to be held by one platoon might be constructed to accommodate two at a pinch.

Commanders of piquets must be on their guard against attempts to lure a part of the garrison into an ambushade with a view to capturing the piquet.

4. Every effort should be made to make the garrison reasonably comfortable. Tents or shelters, full kits and cooking utensils should be provided. Sanitary arrangements must be made and protected by a sangaar.

34. *Mobile defence.*

Mobile bodies of troops should be located at suitable places along the route with a view to offensive action. These should patrol the vicinity of the route constantly, varying the time and direction of march from day to day. Their presence at any particular point should always come as a surprise to the enemy.

Provided vigilance and precautions are never relaxed, such action has considerable moral, and occasionally material effect on the enemy, and a corresponding effect on our own troops. It is thus a great aid in safeguarding the line of communication.

Small mobile columns should also be located at selected posts, which should perform a similar rôle on a larger scale.

35. *Variation of methods.*

All troops employed on line of communication duties must guard against the danger of always moving at the same hour,

by the same route and occupying the same piquet position day after day.

If such duties are perfunctorily carried out, the troops will sooner or later be ambuscaded, and loss of lives, rifles and morale will result.

Subordinate leaders must be trained to use initiative, cunning and judgment in varying the route and piquet positions.

If a party of the tribesmen can be outwitted and surprised by these means, the moral effect on both sides is very great.

36. *Escort to convoys.*

Provided adequate arrangements have been made for piqueting the route, the escort for a convoy may be quite small. Precautions can, however, never be entirely relaxed.

Small advanced and rear guards are required, also formed bodies of at least six rifles at intervals down the convoy, both for protection and to assist the transport personnel in adjusting loads, etc.

Men with rifles should never march in parties of less than six.

Special escorts are required for treasure, rifles and ammunition.

For convoys of motor transport, armoured cars form the most efficient escort.

No tribesman should ever be permitted to accompany a convoy or party except under a guard.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ATTACK.

37. *General.*

The general principles outlined in Chapter VIII of Field Service Regulations, Vol. II, for the encounter attack are applicable to this form of warfare.

38. *Plan of attack.*

1. It is extremely difficult for troops to manoeuvre to a flank once they have been given an impetus in a certain direction. It is therefore most important to carry out as complete a reconnaissance as possible, including personal reconnaissance by the commander from commanding ground or when possible from the air, before forming the plan of attack and launching the troops.

2. The enemy are peculiarly susceptible to a threat to their flank or rear, and an enveloping attack often gives the best hope of success. On the other hand, the difficulty of achieving envelopment, or the fear of making the enemy retire prematurely, may often lead a commander to prefer to penetrate the enemy's front.

3. It may often be possible to achieve surprise by moving troops under cover of darkness into position for envelopment, or to seize a tactical point.

4. The position of the commander must be such as to give him an extensive view of the battle field.

5. As in all forms of warfare, the main point is to ensure that all arms shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent by fire, so as to enable the infantry to assault.

39. *Infantry in the attack.*

1. The infantry should advance up the spurs, avoiding the intervening depressions. It is therefore necessary to study the ground carefully before allotting objectives and frontages.

2. It is seldom that the width of a spur is sufficient to admit of more than one, or at most two, platoons deploying on it. Every company and platoon should deploy in depth, so as to ensure that on every spur supports shall be at hand to drive home the assault, to exploit success, or to meet counter attack.

3. All advances should be by bounds from one tactical feature to another. It will often be advisable for supports to pass through and take the place of the forward bodies.

4. Lewis guns of supporting platoons can often be most usefully employed in bringing oblique fire to bear across a depression to help the forward bodies on a neighbouring spur, and to protect the flanks.

5. Battalions finding the forward bodies should retain their machine gun platoons. The close support of the forward bodies will often be best ensured by exercising brigade control over the machine guns of reserve battalions.

It is always advisable to have some machine guns well forward with a view to pursuit by fire.

6. Steps must be taken to ensure that some machine guns are always in action, while others are advancing to give closer support. This may often be best ensured by working them in sub-sections.

40. *Artillery in the attack.*

1. In the absence of hostile artillery, it is possible for guns to come into action at comparatively short range. As targets are likely to be indistinct and fleeting, and must be engaged

by direct observation, the range for pack artillery should seldom exceed 2,500 yards.

Where the ground is suitable, a porportion of the guns should be held in readiness to advance as the infantry gain ground, in order to afford closer support. Care must, however, be taken to ensure that sufficient guns remain in action.

2. The shape of the ground usually makes it possible for guns firing at close range to register over the heads of the advancing infantry, and to maintain overhead covering fire until the moment of assault.

3. In order to enable the artillery to co-operate to the fullest possible extent, it is essential that the forward bodies of infantry should keep the artillery fully informed of their progress, and of any obstacles which are holding them up.

41. *Tanks in the attack.*

Experience is at present lacking as to the extent to which it will be possible for tanks to co-operate with infantry in an attack in this form of warfare.

As soon as a type of tank has been evolved which is capable of traversing a boulder-strewn river bed without excessive wear and tear, it should prove invaluable in opening the way for the infantry attack, and taking the enemy positions in reverse.

It will probably always be advisable for the infantry to advance in close support of the tanks.

42. *Aircraft in the attack.*

1. The co-operation of aircraft in the attack has great effect in strengthening the morale of the troops and weakening that of the enemy.

They can be most usefully employed in reconnoitring and warning the troops of enemy concentrations, in bombing and machine-gunning the enemy, in directing artillery fire, and in the pursuit.

2. It is highly important that means of intercommunication between air and ground should be perfected, and all arms practised in their use.

43. *Pursuit.*

Natural obstacles will often render pursuit a difficult undertaking except by aircraft, but whenever possible troops should co-operate.

Wherever the ground permits mounted men to move at a faster pace than a walk, a body of cavalry should be kept in hand for pursuit, as the moral and material effect of such action is very great.

Every effort must be made to push some artillery up as quickly as possible.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE WITHDRAWAL.

44. *General principles.*

1. As stated in Section 6, iv., practically every operation eventually develops into a withdrawal, which, in the presence of an enterprising enemy, is always an operation requiring skill and energy on the part of commanders and troops.

2. It is of the first importance that all such operations should be commenced in ample time to ensure their being completed before dark, and that the ground over which the retirement is to be effected should have been previously reconnoitred. If this latter precaution is neglected, there is every probability of the troops falling into an ambushade, or finding themselves involved in difficult ground from which they can only be extricated with heavy loss.

When a force is likely to withdraw by the same route by which it advances, careful note should be taken during the advance of suitable covering positions to be used during the eventual withdrawal.

3. All surplus transport must be moved to the rear before the withdrawal commences, also any troops not actually required for the operation.

4. All withdrawals must be conducted by bodies of troops in succession. The rearmost troops retire at top speed through the successive supporting lines, the latter covering the withdrawal and holding on to their ground until their own retirement can be similarly covered by other troops in position in rear.

While collective movement must be fully controlled, individual movement must be as rapid as possible.

Such rapidity can be combined with precision and complete subordination to the will of the commander, but to ensure this on service, frequent practice in peace is necessary.

The distance apart of successive lines should be as great as is consistent with adequate support of the rear party. At least two, and if possible more lines should be selected and occupied in advance.

Usually the best place for the commander is with the first supporting line.

5. In the event of casualties occurring in a withdrawal, it is often advisable to counter-attack and even to re-occupy a position which has been abandoned, to gain time for the removal of the wounded.

45. *Infantry in the withdrawal.*

1. A large number of men are not required in the operation of withdrawal. In a narrow valley there will often not be room for more than two platoons to deploy abreast, so that one or two companies, each working in two lines, each of two platoons, are usually all the infantry that are required for the rear party and the supporting lines.

2. As mules cannot accompany the rear party, the mobility of Lewis gun sections is less than that of rifle sections, and the former should always withdraw before the latter.

3. A reserve is required for counter attack, or to relieve the original rear guard when exhausted.

46. *Artillery and machine guns in the withdrawal.*

1. To give really effective support to the infantry and to ensure that the withdrawal is carried out with the maximum rapidity,

at least three echelons of guns or machine guns are required. These should move back by successive sections or sub-sections, some being always in action. It is usually advisable that these guns and machine guns should be controlled by column headquarters and not by the rear guard commander.

2. Positions for guns and machine guns should be selected with a view to facility of rapid withdrawal.

3. In a narrow valley the best effect is often obtained by firing on to the opposite side to that on which the guns are situated.

47. *Aircraft and tanks in the withdrawal.*

Retiring troops can often be relieved of much of the pressure of pursuit by the co-operation of low-flying aircraft using bombs and machine guns; also, where the ground is suitable, by the employment of tanks and armoured cars, which must take care to maintain touch with the infantry of the rear guard.

48. *Withdrawal of piquets.*

1. It will as a rule be found best to detail a permanent rear guard to conduct the withdrawal and to withdraw all piquets as indicated in Section 25.

When withdrawing on a route where permanent piquets have been established, or in country that is well known to the force, it may be advisable to divide the route into areas, each unit piqueting the area allotted to it, finding the rear guard within that area, calling in the piquets, and withdrawing through the next succeeding unit.

2. The piquets, if properly handled, afford flank protection to the rear guard in withdrawing, and the responsibility for co-ordinating the movements of the piquets with those of the rear guard rests with the rear guard commander.

The officer detailed to select each successive line should get into communication with the company commander piqueting the area.

The signal to withdraw will be communicated to the piquets as in Section 25, 2.

3. The rear guard must at all times be ready to assist the withdrawal of piquets by fire from the supporting lines.

If the enemy is pressing the withdrawal of piquets, artillery and machine gun fire should be brought to bear on the piquet position immediately the piquet withdraws.

49. *Casualties in the withdrawal.*

As the enemy gives no quarter, it is essential to carry away all wounded men.

If casualties occur in the rearmost line, an immediate local counter-attack is usually necessary to facilitate their withdrawal.

50. *Ambuscades in the withdrawal.*

An ambush requires careful and thorough pre-arrangement, but when successful is a most effective deterrent.

When it is thought likely that the enemy will follow up the withdrawal closely, a strong party may be sent to prepare an ambush at some point through which the column will pass, arrangements being made to give this party support if required.

CHAPTER IX.

FORAGING AND DEMOLITION.

51. General.

1. It is frequently necessary to despatch a flying column to forage or to punish a recalcitrant tribe. Such punishment usually takes the form of demolishing villages and carrying off grain, etc.

2. Whenever such an expedition is undertaken, it is important to ensure that sufficient time is available to carry out the work thoroughly. Half-hearted measures are usually worse than useless. Secrecy and swiftness of execution are essential to success.

3. If the column is to carry out its task and return to camp the same day, the withdrawal must commence in time to admit of the rear guard reaching camp before dark, and it must be remembered that the withdrawal, if followed up, will take considerably longer than the advance.

It follows that such an expedition can only be undertaken in a day if the objective is within four or five miles at most of the camp. If the distance is greater the column must be prepared to bivouac out. In any case it is best to be prepared to remain out for the night in case of need.

4. After such an expedition the enemy practically always presses the withdrawal in order to avenge himself for his burnt villages. Special care is necessary to ensure that the troops are not hampered by transport blocking the road.

52. Protection.

1. In the case of a column which intends to remain out for the night, the protective arrangements on the march are similar to those described in Secs. 20 *et seq.*, the piquets being posted by the advanced guard and withdrawn by the rear guard.

2. In the case of a column returning the same day by the same route, the piquets remain in position after the column has passed and are withdrawn by the rear guard on the return march.

In such cases it is often advisable for the original advanced guard commander to command the rear guard on the return march.

3. The advanced guard is responsible for safeguarding the vicinity while the work is in progress, unless a special body of troops is detailed for the purpose.

Troops should be detailed from the main body for the immediate protection of working parties, also a reserve.

53. Execution of work.

In order that there may be no unnecessary delay, the work must be carefully and systematically organized, the area divided into sectors and troops detailed for each task in each sector.

All parties must work accoutred and with their weapons handy.

54. Foraging.

1. Instructions must be issued regarding the foraging equipment to be taken; the quantity and kind of supplies to be removed; action if supplies are refused; whether or not trees are to be cut down or ringed.

2. If cattle, flocks or camels are to be collected, special parties must be detailed for the purpose, and these must be got away as early as possible, as they move very slowly.

3. Looting and interference with shrines must be repressed.

55. *Demolitions.*

1. Demolition parties require ample equipment, tools and explosives.

2. The first step should be to demolish all towers and to prepare houses for burning.

Unless all woodwork is completely destroyed houses are quickly rebuilt. The best method of preparation is to blow out two corners, or, if time does not admit of this, to knock holes in the roof or walls to create a draught. Straw or brushwood, etc., soaked with oil should then be placed inside the houses.

When the whole area has been prepared, the firing should be systematically carried out, the firers moving up wind.

3. As soon as the firing has been completed the withdrawal should be carried out on the principles outlined in Ch. VIII; special care being taken in timing its commencement.

It must be borne in mind that the intense smoke generated by a burning village may interfere with signal-communications.

CHAPTER X.

ROUTINE IN CAMP AND ON THE LINE OF MARCH.

56. *General.*

Much confusion and resulting loss of time may be saved if all units in a column work on a uniform routine as regards duties in camp and on the line of march.

Certain headings for standing orders which are likely to be of general application are given in Appendix II.

57. *Camp routine.*

1. It is an advantage if units can be arranged in approximately the same relative positions in camp from day to day.

2. Camp roads should be broad and straight, cutting each other at right angles. The centre cross roads should be from 10 to 20 yards wide, those between units 3 yards wide. 3 yards or more must be left clear between the outer pegs of tents or shelters and the support trench.

In order to minimise delay in entering and leaving camp, entrances and exits should be improved, and approaches to the route duplicated.

The camp site should be systematically drained.

3. On arrival in their respective areas, troops should not be dismissed until all measures for protection have been taken and the necessary orders issued.

Assembly posts should be allotted to all units and followers.

To save movement in the dark all units, including sub-units in reserve, should sleep as close as possible to their assembly posts.

Units should fall in on their assembly posts daily at retreat, after which no one should be allowed to leave camp.

4. Half an hour before daylight all camp piquets and inlying piquets should fall in.

At dawn patrols should be sent out to reconnoitre the vicinity of latrines and watering places.

No one should leave camp till all is reported clear.

5. No natives of the country should be allowed inside the camp on any pretext.

Places should be appointed outside the perimeter for the purchase of local supplies and for the political officers to interview tribesmen.

58. Sanitation.

As space is usually restricted and the same camp site may have to be used by successive columns, strict attention must be paid to sanitation, incinerators constructed, and the water supply guarded from pollution.

Day latrines should be outside the perimeter and protected by piquets. Night latrines must be inside, in unit areas.

Day cooking and washing places are usually best placed outside the perimeter.

The camp site should always be thoroughly cleaned and latrines filled in and marked before the rear guard moves off.

CHAPTER XI.

TRAINING.

59. General.

1. In the hills the hill-bred man possesses a natural ascendancy over the plainsman. It is only by the most thorough training that we can hope to correct this inequality, and to imbue our leaders and troops with such a measure of courage, energy, determination and bold offensive spirit as to out-do the enemy in his own hills, and so ensure success in battle.

2. Self-reliance, vigilance and judgment are the chief requisites for overcoming the difficulties inherent in such warfare. Discipline and organization are powerful aids; but unless both officers and men are well trained, capable of adapting their action to unexpected conditions, and of beating the enemy at his own tactics, the campaign will be needlessly long and costly.

All ranks must be trained to be always on the alert, suspicious and observant, and never to relax military precautions nor to adopt the habits of routine when no enemy are seen day after day.

Visual training is a first essential to success in this form of warfare.

3. All officers should study the history of past campaigns on the frontier.

Owing to the numerous protective and other detachments, all subordinate leaders must be trained to a high pitch of initiative. They should also learn to work in silence, words of command being given in a low tone, and the whistle seldom used.

4. The different arms must learn by collective training to co-operate, and to realise their own and each other's powers and limitations.

In the more advanced collective training, it is of great advantage to employ hill men to represent the enemy. In India it is often possible to obtain the services of Pathan soldiers for this purpose.

Special practice is required in intercommunication between air and ground, and in indicating and reporting the position of troops.

5. Training should whenever possible take place in country which approximates in character to the frontier hills. A good deal may be done by means of the sand model, maps and cinema films, but it is only in the hills that men can best acquire that "hill sense" and physical fitness which are essential to give them confidence.

60. Cavalry.

Both men and horses must be trained to move at speed up and down hill over rough boulder-strewn ground, intersected with nullahs.

61. Artillery.

1. Owing to the lack of accurately squared large scale maps, artillery fire must either be observed from the air or ground, or predicted by means of survey methods.

The steep slopes, the difficulty of establishing elaborate means of intercommunication and of describing points on ground bare of easily defined features, render the task of providing rapid and accurate artillery support to the infantry in all circumstances peculiarly difficult.

Effective co-operation can only be ensured by constant training of the two arms together. Infantry officers and noncommissioned officers must learn to direct the fire of artillery on to targets in their vicinity.

2. Both in advance and withdrawal guns should move by bounds, so as to ensure that some are always in action. For this purpose sections frequently have to be employed independently.

3. Guns must be able to come into action and apply accurate fire with lightning rapidity, and to limber up and withdraw without delaying the infantry.

62. Infantry.

1. Besides skill at arms, infantry must acquire a high standard of agility and endurance on the hill side, and acute powers of observation and hearing.

2. They must learn to make use of spurs and to avoid depressions both in advance and withdrawal, and to keep off the skyline; to move on difficult ground at the maximum pace consistent with fighting efficiency; to advance always like a sportsman stalking dangerous game, eyes and ears on the alert, watching front and flanks; to withdraw from a position unnoticed, crawling back to dead ground, and then running at top speed down the steepest and roughest hill side, glancing behind them from time to time in case a comrade is wounded.

3. Subordinate leaders and men must be taught to realise that oblique fire has greater effect than frontal, and that in an attack, when unable to advance, their correct action is to bring covering fire to bear on a neighbouring spur, in order to help forward a unit on the flank.

Lewis gun and rifle sections must be trained to select fire positions with a view to concealment, and to bring instantaneous

and effective covering fire to bear to assist a neighbour-unit.

On every occasion when such fire is likely to be required, weapons must be kept loaded and ready for instant action and observers must be detailed in relays to watch every danger spot.

It may sometimes be advisable to fire an occasional precautionary burst on to an objective, even when no enemy has actually been seen.

4. Targets are as a rule indistinct and fleeting, and a high standard of training in fire direction and control is necessary if fire is to be really effective.

Accurate snap shooting at close range is most important. Owing to the difficulty of replenishing ammunition, strict attention must be paid to fire discipline.

5. Considerable practice is required in keeping Lewis guns on the mules as long as possible. Mules must be trained to negotiate any ground which infantry can cross without using their hands, and to keep pace with infantry when moving at the double.

Lewis gun sections must also be trained to manhandle their guns for long distances up and down hill, keeping pace with rifle sections.

Drivers of Lewis gun mules must be taught to take advantage of folds in the ground and to keep as close as possible to their sections after the gun has been taken off the mule.

6. It is most important that the headquarters of every company and other sub-unit should control the mules allotted to it for ammunition, ensure that they keep as close to the unit as is safe, moving by the best line of advance, and that they are duly protected.

As it will often be impossible to bring forward mules in action, the replenishment of ammunition in the firing line by reinforcements carrying it up must be practised.

The commander of every body of reinforcements should enquire whether ammunition is required to be carried forward.

7. As the establishment of signallers is insufficient to admit of their allotment to every detachment, it is most important that all non-commissioned officers, and a proportion of soldiers, should be trained in semaphore.

8. Every man should be trained to act as a ground scout.

Owing to the danger of losing rifles, scouts should never work singly.

Distant reconnaissance by infantry scouts is usually impracticable, and all patrolling must be carried out by sub-units of sufficient strength to be able to protect themselves.

9. In order to acquire the necessary skill in laying an ambush, it is important that such action should be practised during training. Concealment is of special importance. All ranks must learn the value of a position in shade as opposed to bright sunshine.

10. It must be a point of honour always to remove the wounded, as otherwise they are likely to be brutally murdered.

It is especially desirable to practise the removal of wounded in a withdrawal, if necessary under cover of a counter-attack.

As stretchers can seldom be carried with small bodies of infantry, methods of carrying the wounded by means of putties, pagris and other improvised methods must be practised.

63. Machine guns.

1. The effective use of machine guns depends to an unusual degree on the training of subordinate commanders and of the detachments and mules, as also on their activity.

They must be able to move rapidly over bad ground, to come into action instantaneously, to bring effective fire to bear without loss of time, and to load up and move without delaying the infantry with whom they are co-operating.

The training of scouts, signallers and range finders is also highly important.

Machine gun units, on the move and in action, must at all times be on the look-out for an opportunity, and ready for instant action.

2. Except in the defence of camps and posts, where depth is usually unattainable, guns should be employed in depth, some being always ready to come into action if others are on the move.

3. The country affords exceptional facilities for overhead covering fire, also for cover from fire and view.

Covering fire will normally have to be applied by the use of the "tangent sight" methods. The difference in range and height from the gun of the various bodies of troops to be covered renders the application of safety angles for a number of guns by one control impracticable. Each firer must therefore apply the "tangent sight" method in covering the portion of the front allotted to him, the machine gun commander exercising close supervision. This method of applying overhead fire necessitates a high standard of individual efficiency.

Owing to the command obtainable, the question of "safety clearance" normally only arises when the troops to be covered are in the immediate vicinity of the target, and the exact location of these troops is as a rule easily observed.

In the attack covering fire can be commenced at the outset, and accurate ranging on the objective will be established before the troops approach it.

In the withdrawal the downward rush of the troops in their retirement will rapidly take them below the line of fire.

4. The critical time in the attack is at the moment when the troops are about to reach the objective, and in the withdrawal when they have just left their position. In either case covering fire at this time must be sustained and accurate.

Fire on to a position which is not definitely known to be occupied by the enemy causes unnecessary expenditure of ammunition and is liable to mislead neighbouring troops. On the other hand, a position near which the enemy is known to be massing, or from the vicinity of which heavy sniping has occurred, should be treated as occupied, and heavily engaged until it is clear that enemy action is not developing. If enemy action is awaited as the signal to open fire, the enemy may reach close quarters before effective fire can be brought to bear.

5. Concealment from view is of greater importance than cover from fire. Skilful concealment of guns reduces casualties and affects the morale of the enemy, who finds himself subjected to bursts of fire the origin of which he can neither detect nor strike back at. In this respect the accuracy of Vickers guns at considerable ranges is a great asset.

A careful study of the use of light, shade and background is essential to obtain good results. When possible the guns should be so mounted that the "muzzle blast" will strike rock and not dust.

6. Guns and ammunition should be carried on pack animals as long as possible, thereby economising the energy of the troops.

Although the enemy from his commanding position will probably observe the general line of advance, careful handling of mules and skilful use of ground may make it possible to

negotiate the later stages of the approach into action without undue losses.

7. It may occasionally be difficult to refill belts during an action, and strict attention must be paid to fire control and expenditure of ammunition.

8. As guns will seldom require in any one position more than a proportion of the ammunition carried, it will usually be advisable to divide the unit into two portions :—

- i. The fighting portion consisting of gun mules, first ammunition mules, sub-section commanders, Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of gun teams, and the necessary proportion of signallers and scouts.
- ii. The other portion consisting of the balance of ammunition mules and personnel, including a proportion of signallers.

64. *Piqueting practice.*

1. The posting of flank piquets referred to in Sec. 23 is one of the commonest operations in warfare on the frontier. At the same time it is one in which mistakes are liable to cause much delay and possible loss, and, as the operation has become one of a highly specialised character, certain points are brought to notice in the following paragraphs.

∴ The officer detailing piquets (Sec. 22) can minimise delay by forethought in determining early what points are to be held, and in what strength, by clear orders for the piquet, and by preparations for fire support. The piquet commander can help by selecting the best line of advance, by dispositions for covering movement with fire and by moving at a suitable pace and in a formation calculated to meet possible opposition.

3. The piquet commander can best ensure protection by avoiding the skyline, by early reconnaissance of the vicinity,

by occupying ground suited to the protective role of the piquet, by suitable dispositions to watch all dangerous points and to bring fire to bear on them, by using existing cover, and by co-operating with neighbouring piquets.

4. The piquet commander can minimise the possibility of loss and consequent delay in withdrawal by early reconnaissance of routes, by organizing covering fire within his command, by concealing the exact moment of withdrawal, and by speed of movement; by ensuring a simple system of communication with the rear guard commander, who in his turn assists by preparations for covering fire.

5. In order to demonstrate the practical application of the principles and methods outlined in this manual, and to ensure a certain degree of uniformity in the training of all units, a suggested exercise for the posting and withdrawal of a platoon detailed as piquet, is given in Appendix III.

APPENDIX I.

FORM OF PIQUETING SLIP.

COUNTERFOIL.	1ST FOIL.	2ND FOIL.
Unit.....	Unit.....	Unit.....
Piquet No.....	Piquet No.....	Piquet No.....
Strength :—	Strength :—	Strength :—
B.O....I.O....O.R..	B.O....I.O....O.R..	B.O....I.O....O.R..
Lewis Gun.....	Lewis Gun.....	Lewis Gun.....
Right or Left.....	Right or Left.....	Right or Left.....

APPENDIX II.

SUGGESTED HEADINGS FOR STANDING ORDERS. (Referred to in Sec. 56.)

Duties.

Permanent Duties.
 Provost Establishment.
 Supply Column Guard.
 Water Piquet.
 Headquarter Orderlies and Runners.
 Signallers for Ammunition Column and Ambulances.
 Field Officer of the Day.
 Medical Officer of the Day.
 Liaison Officers.
 Battalion on Duty, to provide.
 Column Reserve.
 Headquarter Camp and Baggage Guard.
 Ambulance Guard.
 Water Pumping Party.
 Entrenching Parties for Headquarters and other units
 as required.
 Time for Duties to Mount.
 Personnel to remain out of action (Infantry Training), Vol. I
 Sec. 2, 4 (ix).
 Strength and Duties of Unit Transport and Baggage Guards
 and Escort.

Supply.

Collection of grain, fodder and firewood.
 Salvage of Stores.

Issue of supplies.
 Disposal of packing material.
 Captured animals.

Transport.

Normal order of march of equipment animals and transport
 Day and night standings in camp.
 Drawing and returning unit transport.
 Time of loading transport.
 Off loading at halts.
 Marshalling transport.
 Formation on line of march.
 Duty of clearing road.
 Unhitching mules in bad ground.
 Control of transport in action.
 Duties of regimental transport officers.
 Riding on transport carts and animals.
 Grazing animals.

Marches.

Time and duration of halts.
 Men falling out sick.
 Parties to march with advanced guard.
 Provost establishment.
 Camp colour parties.
 Sanitary detachments.
 Water party.
 Medical Officer and detachment at rear of column.
 Followers on the march.

Camps.

Routine for laying out camp.
 Responsibility for construction and marking of roadways.
 Cooking places.
 Cover for hospitals.
 Inlying piquets.
 Night firing, signal lights and grenades.
 Protection of working parties.
 Alarm.
 Alarm posts.
 Striking tents.
 Saddling of animals.
 Action of reserve.
 Fire.
 Responsibility for protection of latrines.

Discipline.

Safeguarding of arms.
 Bugle and whistle calls.
 Bounds.
 Working parties.
 Admission to camp.
 Suspicious persons.
 Passes.
 Movements in camp.
 Noise.
 Lights.
 Shrines.
 Counter sign.

Miscellaneous.

Markets.
 Loading revolvers.
 Dogs.
 Followers, badges.
 Badges for night operations.
 Smartness of bearing.
 Intercourse with enemy.

Sanitation.

Responsibility of unit commander.
 Receptacles for drinking water.
 Incineration.
 Disposal of litter.
 Latrines, day and night.
 Marking of fouled ground.
 Sanitary detachments.
 Composes and burial grounds.

Orders, Reports and Returns.

Time of issue of Routine Orders.
 Synchronization of watches.
 Reporting casualties.

Communications.

Care of cables.
 Report of damage to cables.
 Aeroplane messages.

APPENDIX III.

A SUGGESTED FORM OF EXERCISE FOR A PLATOON DETAILED AS PIQUET.

(Referred to in Sec. 64.)

1. This "exercise" (Infantry Training, Volume I, Chapter VIII) is based on experience, past and present, of Frontier fighting.

It should be regarded as a guide only and details should be constantly varied so as to emphasize the necessity for initiative and resource on the part of subordinate leaders in applying correct methods to different circumstances.

The exercise is designed for a platoon, but it should be remembered that piquets may be of any strength from a section upwards (Sec. 23, 2).

2. The officer conducting the exercise (representing the company commander) points out to the platoon commander the approximate position which he is to occupy (Sec. 22).

He informs him of the dispositions and movements of the advanced guard and main body, explaining that they are ready to assist him with fire if necessary, but that he should, if possible, advance under cover of his own Lewis gun, only asking for assistance in the event of his encountering such severe opposition that he cannot overcome it single-handed (Sec. 21, 2).

He also informs him of the position of neighbouring piquets.

He prepares the piquet slip (Appendix I), keeping the counter-foil and giving two foils to the piquet commander.

3. The platoon commander first selects the most suitable line of advance, which should if possible follow a spur or spur

(Sec. 9, 4) and examines the ground with a view to organizing covering fire.

He then points out the objective to section commanders,* explains his plan and issues orders. These will include:—

- (a) The role of the piquet (Sec. 23, 1).
- (b) The piquet number (Sec. 23, 4).
- (c) The position of neighbouring piquets.
- (d) Instructions regarding eventual withdrawal (Sec. 48).
- (e) Orders for "road sentries" (para. 9).

4. The platoon moves off without any unnecessary delay, preceded by ground scouts and covered, if necessary, by the fire of the Lewis gun section (*see* para 5).

The rifle sections should always be disposed in depth, and if the shape of the ground admits they should be in a suitable formation to envelop the piquet position.

A suitable formation for a section in the advance is an irregular "arrowhead" with the men in pairs, the leading pair acting as ground scouts, the remainder echeloned outwards, intervals and distances anything from ten paces upwards.

The supports should follow within close fire supporting distance behind the forward sections.

The platoon commander should accompany the supports.

The advance should be carried out at a steady pace, not so fast as to distress the men unduly. A halt should be made, if possible in dead ground, a short distance before reaching the crest, or any point where the enemy are likely to be lying up.

5. If the piquet position is within range of a suitable Lewis gun position near the route, the Lewis gun section should at once come into action, register by fire the piquet position and

* A form of sight vane, in varying designs, known as the "pointer staff" is in common use among troops in India for this and similar purposes.

any other points from which the enemy may oppose the advance, and remain in observation ready to support the rifle sections by opening fire the moment a target presents itself.

If the piquet position is out of range, the Lewis gun section will advance, if necessary by bounds, co-operating with the rifle sections, to a final position whence it can cover the assault on the piquet position.

In such an advance the Lewis gun section commander, accompanied by ground scouts, should precede the gun, in order to select the best fire position.

6. Bayonets will be fixed for the assault. Whether or not it is advisable to fix bayonets at an earlier stage depends on the probability of the enemy charging. In bright sunlight bayonets are very conspicuous. In bush or scrub bayonets should invariably be fixed.

The assault should be carried out in depth, the supports closing up on the leading sections.

When the assault is seen to be imminent, the Lewis gun section should be prepared to provide sustained and intensive covering fire.

7. On reaching the piquet position, stops must at once be taken to reconnoitre the vicinity. Exposure of men on the skyline must be avoided.

The piquet commander is allowed a certain latitude in selecting the actual position for his piquet, but he must remember that the primary object is to ensure the security of the column rather than that of the piquet itself. If he is led into the error of climbing higher and higher in order to secure himself, he will probably delay the column owing to the difficulty of withdrawing the piquet (Sec. 18).

The platoon should be disposed so as to observe and to bring fire to bear on any point from which the enemy might molest the column or a neighbouring piquet. It will often be necessary

to post sections as subsidiary piquets in order to command dead ground.

Effective cover must be provided, but care must be taken to avoid making the piquet position unnecessarily conspicuous.

Continuous all round watch will be maintained.

Dead ground in the vicinity should be reconnoitred occasionally, especially as the time for withdrawal approaches.

Visual communication will be established with the column either direct or through a support, if posted, and with neighbouring piquets.*

The most suitable route for withdrawal must be reconnoitred, and orders issued in good time as to the method of withdrawal.

8. As the Lewis gun section is considerably less mobile than the rest of the platoon, it may often be advisable to keep it in a supporting position from which it can cover the eventual withdrawal.

On the other hand, it may be advantageous to have the Lewis gun with the piquet, however high it may be, as when the piquet commands some distant nullah bed down which the enemy may mass for an attack. In such a case the Lewis gun must be moved back into support before the piquet finally withdraws. With strong well-trained Lewis gunners the gun can be carried up the steepest hill without undue strain.

The mule should be kept as close as possible to the Lewis gun, in a protected position.

9. It is usually advisable to post a pair of men as "road sentries" (Sec. 23, 4), to indicate to the company commander, or in his absence to the rear guard commander, the position of the piquet and the route by which it will withdraw. They

* A distinctive screen can be used with advantage to indicate the piquet position to troops on the road.

should take up a position where they will meet the rear guard commander well before he comes abreast of their piquet position; and at a place from which their piquet is clearly visible.

Whether or not the road sentries should accompany the piquet in the first instance and return to their eventual position on the road should depend on the distance and visibility of the piquet from the road, and on the time likely to elapse before the rear guard approaches.

When the road is unoccupied by troops for some period as when a column is out for the day and returning later (Sec. 52, 2), road sentries must remain with their piquet until the column returns.

In order that road sentries may be easily recognized, they should fix bayonets. They should be given a piquet slip (Appendix I).

10. As the rear guard commander approaches, the company commander, or in his absence the road sentry, reports to him.

When the platoon commander sees the rear guard approaching, he should at once complete preliminary arrangements for withdrawal (Sec. 44, 4). A few selected men should be kept in the piquet position and the remainder, including the Lewis gun section if with the piquet, moved back to a covering position.

Animals, wounded and men incapable of rapid movement should be sent early down to the road.

11. When the rear guard commander judges that the piquet can be withdrawn (Sec. 48, 2), it will be called up (Sec. 25, 2). A simple method, familiar to all ranks, is essential to avoid risk of misunderstanding, and on this account the piquet number is usually signalled as on the rifle range by means of the rear guard flag. This number is repeated by the piquet commander with flag, handkerchief, head dress, etc., as convenient. The pre-arranged signal to withdraw is then given and acknowledged in a similar manner.

This signal is permissive and means "I am ready for you to come, and the sooner the better," but the actual moment for withdrawal rests with the piquet commander. It may be advisable for him to hold on for a short time after receiving the signal in order to help a neighbouring piquet, or for some other reason, but he should never delay without good cause.

12. The enemy frequently occupy the piquet position immediately the last men have withdrawn. It is therefore most important to conceal movement. The section commander calls on each individual by name to withdraw, each man then creeping back cautiously until under cover. Those left in the position should, if engaged with the enemy, increase their rate of fire. A salutary effect may often be produced by making a feint withdrawal to a short distance below the crest, and re-occupying it before the enemy reaches the position.

Every man must retire at top speed, and the last few men must come away together, covered by fire from the supporting position. The last man to leave signals "Wash out," to indicate that fire may safely be directed above him. The withdrawal to the road is carried out in bounds by successive bodies, the Lewis gun section always being the first to move back.

In the event of casualties occurring in the piquet, all wounded men, and the rifles and ammunition of those killed, must be brought away, if necessary under cover of a counter-attack. All men must be trained to glance behind them from time to time to see if a comrade has been hit.

13. During the withdrawal piquet commanders, and supports, must keep a watch on neighbouring piquets in case co-operation by fire is required.

14. On reaching the road the platoon commander should check over his command and report to the company or rear guard commander for orders as to whether to remain with the rear guard or to rejoin his unit (Sec. 25, 3).

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